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1.  Introduction
There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their
actions.  Examples where coordination is important include research and development
partnerships, joint production, political and trade alliances, as well as the choice of compatible
technologies or conventions such as the choice of a software or language.
 2  For instance, a person
may select a long distance service or internet provider keeping in mind which is best at facilitating
communication with friends and family.  Often there is an advantage to having individuals
coordinate on selecting the same or compatible systems, with examples including long distance
telephone service with MCI’s friends and family plan and internet service with AOL’s buddy list
system. In many such situations, individuals select a strategy (e.g., technology) that they then use
in interactions with many other individuals. Such situations are often characterized by multiple
equilibria corresponding to coordination on different technologies or strategies, where the
equilibria may be Pareto ranked.  The welfare implications of such a ranking provide an obvious
importance to understanding what behavior might be predicted and which factors determine
whether efficient coordination is attained.
In the context of symmetric 2x2 coordination games, Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and
Young (1993) have shown that populations of individuals, who follow a large class of strategy
adjustment procedures (including myopic best response) and are subjected to small random
perturbations in their strategy choices, tend in the long run to coordinate on risk-dominant
strategies as defined by Harsanyi and Selten (1988).  Thus the risk-dominant equilibrium is
selected from among the set of strict Nash equilibria, even if the risk dominant equilibrium is the
inefficient equilibrium.  This result has a natural and simple intuition: the basin of attraction of the
risk-dominant equilibrium is larger than that of the non risk-dominant equilibrium.  In particular,
more than half of the population must be playing the non-risk dominant strategy (which may be
the efficient strategy) for that strategy to be a best response.  So, if everyone initially plays the risk
dominant strategy, then more than half the population must randomly change to the efficient
strategy for the dynamics to move towards the efficient equilibrium, while if everyone initially
plays the efficient strategy, then less than half the population needs to randomly change to the risk
dominant strategy for the dynamics to move to the risk dominant solution.  In the long run this
leads to a higher probability that in any given period players will be playing the risk dominant
equilibrium, and the risk dominant solution is the stochastically stable convention, in the sense
coined by Foster and Young (1990).
In the Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) models each player plays against
every other player in the population (or equivalently faces each other player with an equal
probability).  While this is plausible in some contexts, many situations where social coordination is
an issue involve more specific interaction patterns.  These results are robust to some alternative
interaction structures, for instance where individuals interact according to fixed neighborhood
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and Farrell (1994) and Liebowitz and Margolis (1994)).3
structures as shown by Ellison (1993) (see also Young (1998)).  Thus we are left with the
somewhat pessimistic result that a society can be expected in the long run
3 to coordinate on the
risk-dominant equilibrium, even in cases where it is inefficient and so in society’s common interest
to do otherwise.   However, we show in an example here that for some fixed network
structures it is possible to have multiple stochastically stable states, with some involving play of
equilibria that are not risk dominant.  This example points out the important role of the particular
network structure in determining stochastic stability, and underlines the importance of
endogenizing the network structure.
Ely (1998) (see also Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (1997)) considers models where the
interaction structure is endogenized by locational choices.  Individuals select a location at which
to reside and then interact according to a pattern governed by that location and the location of
other individuals. Conditions are given under which the efficient equilibrium is the one that is
reached by a society even when it is not risk dominant.  In the model of Ely (1998) if some
individual randomly moves to an unoccupied location and plays the efficient strategy, then other
individuals would like to move to that location and play the efficient strategy rather than staying
at a location where they play the inefficient strategy.  This leads to efficient play.  While this result
is encouraging in showing how endogenizing the interaction pattern can lead to efficiency, this
result depends on the locational aspect of the interaction patterns.
4    In particular, in changing
locations agents are essentially allowed to sever all old ties, form new ties, and switch
technologies simultaneously.  While there are situations where location is the major factor in
determining with whom an individual interacts, in many applications individuals choose with
whom they interact in a more discretionary manner, not having to completely uproot to form new
relationships.
Our model is not a location model, but rather one where players choose their interaction patterns
on an individual-by-individual basis.   We model the interaction pattern as a network where
individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players.    Players choose
whether to add or sever links based on their (prospective) partner’s past behavior.  With such
endogenous interaction patterns there exist multiple stochastically stable states of play, including
some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk
dominant.  Thus, it is possible to have inefficient play be stochastically stable even when the
efficient strategy is risk dominant, in a model where individuals completely control with whom
they interact.
2.  Network Interactions and Stochastic Stability
Networks
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The set N={1,...,n} is a finite set of individual players.  These may be people, firms, computers,
countries, or other relevant participants.  We assume that n>2, as networks among two players
are not very interesting.
The network relations among these individuals are represented by a graph whose nodes or
vertices are the individuals, and whose links or edges are connections between the individuals.
The complete network or graph, denoted g
N, is the set of all subsets of N of size 2.  The set of all
possible networks on N is {g ￿g￿g
N}.
5  Let ij denote the subset of N containing i and j and is
referred to as the link ij.  The interpretation of ij˛g is that in the network g, individuals i and j are
linked.
Note that i is linked to j if and only if j is linked to i, so that we study non-directed networks
where interaction requires mutual consent.
Before endogenizing the network, let us discuss how interaction occurs given a fixed network.
Coordination Games played on a Fixed Network
Consider the following situation as described by Young (1998).  A population of n players plays a
game repeatedly.  Players are located on a fixed network g.  In each period t, a player i chooses an
action a
t
i ˛{A,B}, and then receives a payoff which is










j)                                             (1)
where pij(g) is a factor that weighs the relative importance of the interaction between i and j. For
our purposes, set pij(g)=1 if ij˛g and pij(g)=0 if ij ˇ g.  Thus, each player interacts only with the
players that he is directly connected to.
The following matrix describes the payoff function vi.  The matrix lists only the payoff to player i,






Let a>d and b>c, so that the game is a coordination game, with two pure strategy equilibria, A,A
and B,B.  Let (a-d)>(b-c), so that A,A is the risk-dominant equilibrium in the sense of Harsanyi
and Selten (1988).   This equilibrium has the property that each player is choosing a strategy that
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is also a best response to the other player mixing 50/50.  Thus, A is the strategy that is a best
response to the largest set of beliefs over possible plays of the opponent, and so the risk dominant
equilibrium is the pure strategy equilibrium with a larger basin of attraction than the other pure
strategy equilibrium.  Specifically, playing A is a player’s best response if the fraction of his
opponents who play A is greater than or equal to (b-c)/(a-d+b-c) < 1/2.  Thus if a=3, b=1, and
c=d=0, then playing A is a best response if ¼ or more of a player’s opponents play A.
In the case where n is even, assume that A is the best response to a mixture of (n-2)/[2(n-1)] on A
and  n/[2(n-1)] on B.  So, for instance, if n=10 then A is a best response for a player who is
playing against 4 other players who play A and 5 who play B.  This assumption ensures an
asymmetry among strategies, so that our results of multiple stochastically stable states are not
artificial.
The dynamic process is described as follows.  Each period one player is chosen at random (say
with equal probability, although that is not important) to update his strategy.  A player updates his
strategy myopically, best responding to what the other players with whom he interacts did in the
previous period.  However, there is also a probability 1>e>0 that a player trembles,and chooses a
strategy that he did not intend to.  Thus, with probability 1-e the strategy chosen is a
t
i = arg maxai
ui(ai,a
t-1
-i) and with probability e the strategy is  a
t
i „ arg maxai ui(ai,a
t-1
-i).
6  The probabilities of
trembles are identical and independent across players, strategies, and periods.
7  These trembles
can be thought of as mistakes made by players or exogenous factors that influence players'
choices.  Once initial strategies are specified, the above process leads to a well-defined Markov
chain where the state is the vector of actions, a
t, that are played in period t.  The Markov chain
has a unique stationary distribution, denoted µ
e(a).  Thus, for any given initial strategies, µ
e(a)
describes the probability that a will be the state in some period (arbitrarily) far in the future.  Let µ
= lime µ
e.  Following the terminology of Foster and Young (1990), a given state a is stochastically
stable if it is in the support of µ.  Thus, a state is stochastically stable if there is a probability
bounded away from zero that the system will be in that state according to the steady state
distribution, for arbitrarily small probabilities of trembles.
Let us consider a specific example that illustrates the importance of the network configuration in
determining the stochastically stable states.  Let n=4 and a=3, b=1, and c=d=0.  This is a
coordination game where A,A is both the efficient and risk dominant equilibrium.  In this
situation, for either the complete network or circle networks the unique stochastically stable state
is all players playing A; but, for the star network there are two stochastically stable states:  all
players playing A and all players playing B.
Example - The Complete Network
First, consider the case where players are located on the complete graph, g
N.  Recall that pij=1 for
each ij˛g.  Thus for the graph g
N, each player plays once against every other player in a period (or
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7 The structure of trembles is not innocuous.  As detailed by Bergin and Lipman (1996), varying the perturbation
structure can have a profound influence on the dynamic process.  We return to discuss this shortly.6
equivalently faces each other player with an equal probability). The stochastically stable state in
this case is for all players to play A, as shown in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young
(1993).
Let us briefly go over the intuition behind this example and the Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)
and Young (1993), as this will be useful later on.   If at least one of the other players played A last
period, then a player who is updating her strategy will choose to play A.  A player who is
updating her strategy will choose to play B only if all of the other players played B last period.
So, consider a situation where all players are playing A.  If due to an e-error some player switches
to B, the other players when called on to update will not choose to switch and will continue to
play A.  This situation will update back to the situation where all players play A.  It takes three
trembles on three different players in order to have the remaining player choose to switch to B.
So, the process takes at least three trembles (without any intermediate updating by those players)
to switch the process from all playing A to all playing B.  If all players are playing B, then if one
player switches to playing A the other players when called on to update will choose to switch to
A.  Thus, with only one tremble the process can lead from all playing B to all playing A.  While
this is not a complete description of the stochastic process it outlines why it is relatively easier (by
orders of magnitude in the number of trembles needed) to move from social coordination on B to
coordination on A than the other way around.
Example - Circle Networks
Next consider the case where players are located on a circle, as for instance in the network
g={12,23,34,41}.  The unique stochastically stable state will be all players playing A as shown by
Ellison (1993), and as he shows this result also holds for some more general neighborhood
structures on circles.
The intuition behind this example is similar to that of complete networks.  Here, each player only
cares about what his or her two neighbors are playing.  Again, as long as one neighbor is playing
A, an updating player will choose to play A.  Thus it takes both neighbors switching to B in order
to have a player want to switch from playing A to playing B, while it only takes one neighbor
switching to A to get a player to want to switch from playing B to playing A.
Example - Star Networks
Lastly, consider the situation where players are located on a star such as g={12,13,14}.  The
dynamics associated with this network differ in important ways from those described around the
previous two examples.  With a star network there are two stochastically stable states: one where
all players play A and the other where all players play B.
To see the intuition behind this example note that now players 2, 3 and 4 care only about what
player 1 is playing, and they will update to play whatever 1 played last period when called on to
update.  Player 1, in contrast, cares about what all the players are doing. Thus one tremble by
player 1 can lead from a network where all play A to one where all play B.  Alternatively, any
tremble of any player changing from B to A can lead from a situation where all play B to one7
where all play A.  Thus starting from either equilibrium of all play A or all play B, we need only
one tremble to have updating lead naturally to the other equilibrium.  As the relative number of
trembles is the important factor in determining the set of stochastically stable states, both of these
states are stochastically stable.
Note that the relative probability in the limiting distribution of the state where all play A is higher
than that of the state where all play B.  This follows from the fact that any single tremble can lead
to a transition from the state where all play B to the state where all play A, while a specific
tremble is needed to lead to a transition from the state where all play B to that where all play A.
Nevertheless, the state where all play the inefficient and non-risk dominant equilibrium still
receives positive probability in the limit distribution and is stochastically stable.
The star example shows that it is possible for a network of individuals to have multiple
stochastically stable states in the coordination game, including some where the inefficient and non
risk-dominant strategy is selected.   This result is in contrast with the previous literature (e.g.,
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993), and Ellison (1993 and 1995)) where the risk
dominant equilibrium is always selected.
8  This result has seemingly negative implications, as
there may be inefficient play.  On the other hand, the result can also have positive implications in
the case where the risk dominant equilibrium A, A is inefficient.  For instance, if a-c>b-d but b>a,
then the analysis of the above examples still holds, and under the complete or circle networks only
play of the inefficient equilibrium A,A is stochastically stable, while on the star network play of
the efficient equilibrium B,B is also stochastically stable.
This example seems to contradict Theorem 6.1 (and Corollary 6.1) in Young (1998).  Young’s
result states that for any fixed network structure the unique stochastically stable state in a
symmetric coordination game is for all players to coordinate on the risk dominant strategy.
However, there is no contradiction between the results as the perturbation structure is different in
the two analyses.   We assume that the probability of a player trembling (i.e., a perturbation or
mistake) from A to B when A is the best response is the same as the probability of a player
trembling from B to A when B is the best response.  In contrast, Young (1998) assumes that
updating takes place according to a distribution that is proportional to a factor that is log-linear in
payoff.  In particular, as e goes to 0 in the Young (1998) framework, the probability of any player
trembling from A to B when others are playing A becomes infinitely less likely than the
probability of trembling from B to A when the others are playing B.  Such an error structure is
very tractable and powerful in its predictions (e.g., see Blume (1993) and Young (1998)), and
reflects the belief that errors should be less relatively likely when they are more costly.  However,
such an error structure is extreme in that very small differences in relative payoff comparisons
across strategies, lead to infinite differences in limiting perturbation probability.   If an error
reflects exogenous factors or limits in a player’s calculation ability, then there is no reason to
assume that such an error should become infinitely more likely for some strategies versus others.
While we work with the other extreme assumption of equal probabilities of trembles, the results
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we present here would still hold if the probabilities of single errors vary across strategy choices as
long as the ratio of these error probabilities does not become infinite.
Given that the set of stochastically stable states varies with the network structure, we now turn to
the question of which networks arise endogenously if the network structure is at the players’
discretion.  If players choose both with whom they interact as well as what strategies they play,
then which networks should we expect to see?  This is the question we address next.
3. Endogenous Networks and Stochastic Stability




t-1 denote the network at the end of period t-1 and a
t-1 denote the action profile at the end of
period t-1. In an arbitrary period t three things occur.
1. First, one link ij is chosen at random according to the fixed probability distribution {pij }
where pij   >0 for each ij.  This is the only link that can be formed or severed at time t.
Players decide whether to add or sever the link, and make this choice based on the
assumption that players (including themselves) will play the same strategy as in the
previous period.  If the link is not in the network then it is added if at least one player’s
utility increases and the other player’s does not decrease.  If the link is already in the
network then it is severed if either player would benefit from its removal.  After the choice
is made, with probability 1>g>0 the choice is reversed by a tremble.  This process
determines a network g
t according to well-defined probabilities.
9
2. Second, one player i is randomly selected to adjust their strategy according to the fixed
probability distribution {qi} where qi >0 for each i.  This player chooses the strategy that is
a best response to the current network g
t and to the previous periods’ play configuration
a
t-1.
10  After the choice is made, with probability 1>e>0 it is reversed by a tremble. All
trembles and random selections are independent. This determines a strategy profile a
t
according to well defined probabilities.
11
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t-1 ) then g
t = g
t-1 -ij with probability (1-g) and g
t-1 with probability g.  If ij˛g









t-1 ) then g
t = g
t-1  with probability (1-g) and g
t-1-ij with probability g.
If ijˇg








t-1 ) with one inequality strict, then g
t = g
t-1
+ij with probability (1-g) and g
t-1 with probability g. Otherwise, g
t = g
t-1  with probability (1-g) and g
t = g
t-1+ij with
probability g.   Taking probabilities across ij according to pij leads to a distribution over g
t as a function of g
t-1.
10 Again, assume that the ai   that maximizes ui (g
t , ai, a
t-1










i   =argmax ui (g
t , ai, a
t-1
-i  ) with probability 1-e and a
t
i   „argmax
ui (g
t , ai, a
t-1




3. Lastly, players play the coordination game with the other players that they are directly
connected to in the network and receive the payoff u i(g
t , a
t ), as defined in equation (1)
where pij(g
t )=1 if ij˛g
t, and pij(g
t )=0 if ijˇg
t.
Assume that disconnected players, when identified in step 2, choose a best response to being
uniformly randomly matched with any other player and to the previous period’s play configuration
a
t-1. As before, the process determines a finite state, irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain, and thus
has a unique stationary distribution µ
g, e over states, where states are now network/strategy
configurations.
A network/strategy configuration g,a is stochastically stable if it is in the support of µ = limg=keﬁ0
µ
g,e,  where we take g and e to zero at the same rate; so g = ke for some k>0.   
12
In the above process, players adjust their links and strategies independently.   Players do not
consider the possibility of changing their strategy when adding or severing a link and the possible
implications that this might have for the future evolution of play.  This sort of consideration may
be important when there are relatively small numbers of forward-looking players who are well-
informed about the network, strategies played, and the motivation of others.  However, in larger
networks and situations where players’ information might be local and limited, or in situations
where players significantly discount the future, myopic behavior is a more natural assumption.
Proposition 1: If c>0 and d>0, then the unique stochastically stable state is the fully connected
network (g
N) with all players playing A.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix.
Proposition 1 states that if the payoff to mis-coordination is positive, then the unique
stochastically stable state involves formation of the full network and all players coordinating on
the risk dominant equilibrium regardless of whether or not it is efficient.   This result suggests that
endogenizing the network leads to outcomes similar to those suggested in the exogenous network
literature of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993, 1998), and Ellison (1993, 1995).
Proposition 1 also has implications regarding speed of convergence to the stochastically stable
state.  As discussed in Ellison (1993, 1995) and Young (1998), network structures with features
that are similar to that of a circle, i.e., where players have tight local interactions and are more
loosely linked across neighborhoods, have faster speeds of convergence to the stochastically
stable state.   Young (1998) has an elegant characterization of such ``close knit’’ networks.
However, Proposition 1 says that when the network is endogenized, we will not end up with the
close knit networks that have the nice speed-of-convergence properties, but instead we end up
with fully connected networks.  This occurs because links are essentially costless.  Any two
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disconnected players will benefit from adding a link since all links play in each period and all links
guarantee positive payoffs.  With this in mind, the intuition behind Proposition 1 is transparent as
the usual evolutionary reasoning applies and so the full network with all playing A is the only
stochastically stable state.
Proposition 1 should be interpreted cautiously, however, as it depends critically on there being no
significant costs to having a link.  This is captured in c>0 and d>0, where players still receive a
positive payoff when they fail to coordinate.  Things change if we add a significant cost to
maintaining links. If there is a cost k>0 of maintaining a link, which is just subtracted from each
entry of the payoff matrix, then for non-trivial k the payoff from mis-coordination can be negative.
As the structure of the payoff matrix is maintained, this can be modeled simply by considering
variations in the payoff parameters a,b,c, and d.
Proposition 2: If failing to coordinate in the game is costly so that c<0 and d<0, (but
coordinating links are still beneficial so that a>0 and b>0), then there are two stochastically
stable states: a fully connected network with all players playing A, and a fully connected network
with all players playing B.
The proof of Proposition 2 appears in the appendix.
If a<0 (or b<0), then the state where all play A (or all play B) is no longer stable.  If both are less
than 0, then the disconnected network becomes the only stochastically stable state.
Proposition 2 shows that endogenizing the network has implications beyond predictions of the
network structure; it also has implications for the strategies that are chosen in the game.
Proposition 2 shows that there are stochastically stable states where actions are played that are
neither risk dominant nor efficient.  That is, all playing B can be part of a stochastically stable
state even when a>b.  Comparing this result to our exogenous network results, we find that while
the star network does not arise endogenously, stochastically stable play is similar to play observed
on the exogenous star network.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 builds off of the endogeneity of the network.  Suppose that we
are initially in a network where all players are playing A and are fully connected.  Suppose that
two trembles occur and two players start playing B.  Then, players playing A would like to sever
links to these players, as it is costly to maintain a link with B players.  These B players would like
to join together and form a component playing B.  This component can then continue to grow as
additional trembles occur.  This process turns out to be symmetric in the way it moves between A
and B, thus allowing both states to be stable.  The other candidates for stochastically stable states
are situations where there are two separate, fully-connected components to the network, one
playing all A and the other playing all B.  However, it can be shown that these are not
stochastically stable.
Let us make some further remarks concerning Proposition 2.
First, although Proposition 2 has all players fully connected in the stochastically stable states, the11
speed of transition from any state to one of the stochastically stable states may be faster than with
an exogenous fully connected network.  That is, the network adjusts as players’ strategies change.
So, even though the stable states have fully connected networks, the transitions involve changes in
those connections that allow trembles to build up one-at-a-time.
13  In the exogenous fully
connected network case, to go from all playing B to all playing A requires m trembles (where m =
n(b-c)/(a-d+b-c) < n/2), which must occur simultaneously.  In Proposition 2, to go from all
playing B to all playing A requires (n-1) trembles, but these trembles can occur one-at-a-time.
Thus Proposition 2 will have a faster speed of convergence than the fully connected network if m
is large, but will have a slower speed of convergence if m is small.
Second, Proposition 2 depends on the relative change rates of links and strategies.  For instance,
if link patterns are much more rigid than strategies (by an order of 1/e), then some of the
reasoning above may not apply as players strategies may readjust before the network adjusts.  The
relative ease of change, of course, will depend on the application.
Third, the analysis depends on myopic choices on the part of players.  Players are not forecasting
the responses of other players, in terms of the strategies played or the network, when they decide
on their own actions and links.  This myopia is clearly important in the reasoning behind the
results, and thus the analysis is best suited for large settings where history is the best benchmark
for predicting behavior.  Although this is a caution that applies fairly broadly to the literature on
stochastic stability, it has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Finally, the analysis above assumes that in each period, players get a separate payoff for each
player with whom they are connected.  If instead, there is a limit so that each player actually plays
on only a subset of links, but still bears some cost for all links that he or she maintains, then the
results can change and in particular we can find mixed stochastically stable states where there is
play of different strategies by different groups.  To get a feeling for this, consider an example
where a player’s payoff is the average (rather than the sum) of the payoffs from each of her links
and that the player pays a positive cost for each link.  Then the stochastically stable states are
networks where players are paired and each pair of players plays the same strategy as her partner.
However, it is straightforward to check that different pairs may play different strategies.  
3. Concluding Remarks
From the previous literature one might take away two predictions: (i) With fixed networks of
interaction society will coordinate on the risk-dominant equilibrium, and, (ii) with endogenous
interaction patterns as determined by location (with homogeneous players
14) society will
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Here we have shown via an example that (i) may fail and
one can see multiple stochastically stable states on a fixed network; and similarly that (ii) may fail
as with endogenous networks, multiple stochastically stable states can include coordination on
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equilibria that are neither efficient nor risk dominant.
In our model, whether or not efficient play or risk dominant play (or neither) is reached depends
on a number of assumptions, such as whether or not failure to coordinate is costly, whether
players are limited in the number of interactions that they can undertake, and whether players are
forward looking or myopic. These assumptions are in addition to more basic differences between
an endogenous network approach and a locational approach, such as caring about the sum of
payoffs across interactions rather than an average
15 and being able to refuse to connect with an
individual.
This sensitivity to a wide variety of assumptions suggests that the conclusions in this literature be
interpreted cautiously.
16  Given this sensitivity to a number of aspects of behavior and interaction
technology, there may not be broad-sweeping predictions that one can make concerning a
society’s ability to reach efficient coordination, but instead such predictions are likely to be
dependent on the details of the application.  Rather than trying to catalogue results based on a
matrix of modeling choices, we suggest tailoring the models to match specific applications as they
arise.
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Appendix
Let x = (g,a) represent a network and strategy combination.
Two network-strategy combinations x and x’ are adjacent if they differ by at most one link and/or
one player’s strategy.
Define a path (x1,…,xk ) as a sequence of network-strategy combinations such that xi and xi+1 are
adjacent but xi „ xi+1  for each i=1,...,k-1.  Let p(x1,xk ) represent the set of all possible paths
starting at x1 and ending at xk.
Given a two adjacent networks, (x,x’), let the resistance r(x,x’) be the number of trembles needed
to go from x to x’.  A tremble is needed if the players involved are not willing to make the change
of the link and/or the strategy that is needed to move from x to x’.  Thus to go from x to x’ takes
at most 2 trembles (to change both the link and the strategy) and at least 0 trembles.
To be precise, let x  =(g,a) and x’ = (g’,a’).  No tremble is needed to move from g to g’ (given a)
if g’=g;  g’=g-ij and either u i(g, a)<u i(g-ij, a) or uj(g, a)<u j(g-ij, a); or if g’=g+ij and u i(g+ij, a)‡u
i(g, a) and uj(g+ij, a)‡u j(g, a) with one inequality holding strictly.  Otherwise, one tremble is
needed to move from g to g’ (given a).  No tremble is needed to move from a to a’ (given g’) if
a=a’ or if ai „a’i and a’i =argmax ui (g’,ai, a’-i ).  Otherwise, one tremble is needed to move from a
to a’ (given g’).  Then, r(x,x’)=2 if one tremble is needed to go from g to g’ (given a) and one
tremble is needed to go from a to a’ (given g’).  r(x,x’)=1 if one tremble is needed to go from g to
g’ (given a) and no trembles are needed to go from a to a’ (given g’), or if no trembles are needed
to go from g to g’ (given a) and one trembles is needed to go from a to a’ (given g’).   r(x,x’)=0 if14
no trembles are needed to go from g to g’ (given a) and no trembles are needed to go from a to a’
(given g’).
Define the resistance of a path r(x1,…,xk) as  ￿i=1
k-1 r(xi,xi+1).
The path (x1,…,xk ) is an improving path if r(x1,…,xk) = 0.  For further discussion of improving
paths, see Jackson and Watts [1998].
Let r(x1,xk) = min (X1,…,Xk) ˛p(X1,Xk) r(x1,…,xk).
A theorem from Young [1993] is instrumental in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.  Before
stating Young’s [1993] theorem, the following definitions from Young (1993) are needed.
Consider a stationary Markov process on a finite state space X with transition matrix P.
A set of mutations of P is a range (0,a] and a stationary Markov process on X with transition
matrix  P(e)  for each e  in (0,a], such that (i) P(e) is aperiodic and irreducible for each  e  in (0,a],
(ii) P(e) ﬁP, and (iii) P(e)xy  > 0 implies that there exists r‡0 such that 0<lim e
-r P(e) xy  <¥.  
The number r in (iii) above is the resistance of the transition from state x to y.  There is a path
from x to z of zero resistance if there is a sequence of states starting with x and ending with z
such that the transition from each state to the next state in the sequence is of zero resistance.
Note that from (ii) and (iii), this implies that if there is a path from x to z of zero resistance, then
the n-th order transition probability associated with P of x to z is positive for some n.
The recurrent communication classes of P, denoted X 1,…,X J, are disjoint subsets of states such
that (i) from each state there exists a path of zero resistance leading to a state in at least one
recurrent communication class, (ii) any two states in the same recurrent communication class are
connected by a path of zero resistance (in both directions), and (iii) for any recurrent
communication class X j and states x in X j and y not in X j   such that P(e)xy  > 0 ,  the resistance
of the transition from x to y is positive.
For two communication classes X i  and X j , since each  P(e) is irreducible, it follows that there is
a sequence of states x1,…xk with x1 in X i  and xk in X j  such that the resistance of transition from
xk to xk+1 is defined by (iii) and finite.  Denote this by r(xk,xk+1).   Let the resistance of transition
from X i  to X j  be the minimum over all such sequences of  S1
K-1 r(xk,xk+1), and denote it by r(X i  ,
X j ).
Given a recurrent communication class X i , an i-tree is a directed graph with a vertex for each
communication class and a unique directed path leading from each class j ( „i) to i.   The
stochastic potential of a recurrent communication class X j    is then defined by finding an i-tree
that minimizes the summed resistance over directed edges, and setting the stochastic potential
equal to that summed resistance.
Given any state x, an x-tree is a directed graph with a vertex for each state and a unique directed15
path leading from each state y ( „x) to x.   The resistance of x is then defined by finding an x-tree
that minimizes the summed resistance over directed edges.
The following theorem is a combination of Theorem 4 and Lemmas 1 and 2 in Young:
Theorem (Young [1993]): Let P be the transition matrix associated with a stationary Markov
process on a finite state space with a set of mutations {P(e)} and with corresponding (unique)
stationary distributions {m(e)}.  Then m(e) converges to a stationary distribution m of P, and a
state x has m x >0 if and only if x is in a recurrent communication class of P which has a minimal
stochastic potential.  This is equivalent to x having minimum resistance.
Proof of Proposition 1:  The stochastic process of Proposition 1 determines a finite state,
irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain, and thus has a unique stationary distribution µ
g, e  over states,
where states are network/strategy combinations.  Given that  g = ke,  we can write µ
g, e as µ
e.





N,B) represent the states where players are in the fully connected network g
N
and all players play strategy A (or B, respectively). This follows since all payoffs are strictly
positive and so players always prefer to add a link when given the opportunity, and the fact that
all players must coordinate on strategy A or B given the symmetry of payoffs and the assumed
uniqueness of the best response in the coordination game.  Note also that any path from (g
N,A) or
(g
N,B) to any adjacent network-strategy pair has positive resistance.
Thus, the recurrent communication classes as defined above must be {(g
N,A)} and {(g
N,B)}.  The
set of stochastically stable states depends on which of these states has the smallest resistance.
Given the theorem above, we need only find the minimum resistance over paths from {(g
N,A)} to
{(g
N,B)} and compare that to the minimum resistance over paths from {(g
N,A)} to {(g
N,B)}.
If agents are in the g
N network and all playing B, then given the payoff structure if we consider a
path from (g
N,A) to (g
N,B) where only strategies are changed it takes less than n/2 trembles to get
all agents to switch to all playing A.   So, r((g
N,B), (g
N,A)) < n/2.  Next we bound r((g
N,A),
(g
N,B)).  If agents are in a g
N network and all agents play A, then given the payoff structure if no
links are changed it will take at least n/2 trembles to get players to want to switch to play B.  So,
if the resistance is less than n/2 it must involve some trembles on links.  Let us consider what it
would take to get some single player to switch from playing A to B.  For a player to switch from
A to B more than half of the players that this player is linked to must play B.  Thus, if k links are
severed, then (n-k)/2 players must be playing B if n-k-1 is odd and (n-k+1)/2 if n-k-1 is even.  So
starting at (g
N,A) to get a single player to want to switch from A to B involves at least k+(n-k)/2
trembles and this is at least n/2.  Thus r((g
N,A), (g




the unique stochastically stable state.  ￿
Proof of Proposition 2:   If a>0>d and b>0>c then players will prefer to sever any link to a player
who plays a strategy that is different than their own, and add a link to any player who plays a16
strategy that is the same as their own.  Thus, the set of recurrent communication classes are
{(g
N,A)}, {(g
N,B)}, and each {(g
k,A/g
n-k,B)} for 2£k£n-2.  Here (g
k,A/g
n-k,B) represents any state
where there are two separate fully connected components, one of size k and the other of size (n-
k) with all players in the k-size component playing A and all players in the (n-k) size component
playing B.  Note that for any k, there are many different states (g
k,A/g
n-k,B) since here are many
ways to select k individuals.  Each is a distinct recurrent communication class.
Given Young’s theorem, we look for the set of recurrent communication classes with minimum
resistance, found by constructing restricted (g,a)-trees.  First we construct a restricted (g
N,A)-
tree.  Direct (g
N,B) to any of the (g
2,A/g
n-2,B) vertices; (g
N,B) has resistance 2 to an improving
path leading to any (g
2,A/g
n-2,B) vertex.  (Starting at (g
N,B) allow two trembles to change two
player’s strategies to A.  Then there is an improving path leading to a (g
2,A/g
n-2,B) vertex.  This
improving path exists since all of the B players will receive a negative payoff from their link with
the A players, and will sever it when given the opportunity.  Note that (g
N,B) has a distance of
more than 2 from an improving path to any other communication class, since more than 2 players
strategies must be changed.)   Any of the (g
k,A/g
n-k,B), 2£k£n-3, vertices has a distance of 1 from
an improving path leading to one of the (g
k+1,A/g
n-k-1,B) vertices; simply allow a tremble to change
one of the B players to strategy A.  Any of the (g
n-2,A/g
2,B) vertices has a distance of 1 from an
improving path leading to (g
N,A).  Simply allow a tremble to change one of the B players to
strategy A, then the remaining B player will sever the tie to this player.  The remaining B player
will now be unlinked; since we assume that disconnected players, choose a best response to the
current average play of all other players, this B player will change strategies to A and will then
form links with all the other A players.  Thus r(g
N,A) is equal to the number of recurrent
communication classes.  Similar reasoning shows that r(g
N,B) is the same.
Next we compute r(g
k,A/g
n-k,B) for 2£k£n-2.  From the above, we know that g
N/A and g
N/B are
both a distance of 2 or more from an improving path leading to any (g
k,A/g
n-k,B).  Thus r(g
k,A/g
n-
k,B) is strictly greater than the number of recurrent communication classes, and so larger than
r(g
N,A)=r(g
N,B).  It follows from Young’s theorem that the stochastically stable states are (g
N,A)
and (g
N,B).  ￿